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Abstract 
Scholars have long been interested in when and to what degree managers are able to exert control over their 
organizations. In this review, we examine managerial discretion, or the latitude of action available to managers. 
Since its introduction, scholars have attempted to explain when managers will have discretion, what discretion 
means for organizational outcomes, and how discretion may differentially influence organizational outcomes 
when it enables or constrains leaders. Our review indicates that while a significant number of studies have 
examined discretion, few have attempted to validate the prescriptions of the managerial discretion construct. 
Furthermore, studies to date have primarily focused on the industry task environment as a measure of 
discretion, with less attention focused on the manager’s characteristics and the internal organization. We then 
assess construct validity and the measurement of managerial discretion, offering recommendations to future 
researchers for improving the operationalization of this construct. Finally, we consider how discretion forces 
may interact as either complements or substitutes and how such interactions may have both organizational- and 
individual-level consequences. 
Keywords managerial discretion, executive discretion, CEOs, top management team, latitude of 
action, discretionary forces 
How and when do leaders matter? Management scholars have long attempted to identify when managers can 
alter firm decisions, actions, and performance. While management theorists have long implicitly understood the 
role of constraints in the ability of firms and managers to undertake decisions (see, e.g., Hannan & Freeman, 
1977; Lieberson & O’Connor, 1972; Salancik & Pfeffer, 1977), it was not until Hambrick and Finkelstein’s 
(1987) conceptualization of “managerial discretion” that scholars formally developed a model for what factors 
may provide executives with the ability to influence firm outcomes. Managerial discretion can be defined as the 
latitude of managerial action available to a decision maker (e.g., a top manager) in a given situation (Hambrick & 
Finkelstein). Higher discretion enables leaders with a wider range of options (J. T. Campbell, Campbell, Sirmon, 
Bierman, & Tuggle, 2012) and a greater latitude of action (Hambrick & Abrahamson, 1995). Because top 
managers are appointed to executive positions with the goals of sustaining and improving organizational 
performance and effectiveness (Barker, Patterson, & Mueller, 2001), it is critical to understand what constrains 
leaders and, alternatively, to understand what enables them to influence organizational outcomes. 
In this review, we seek to examine how research has advanced the concept of managerial discretion and explore 
both its antecedents and consequences. Hambrick and Finkelstein (1987) argued that managerial discretion 
comes from sources at three levels: the environment, the organization, and the individual. A majority of 
managerial discretion research focuses on the role of the task environment, or industry characteristics, in 
creating managerial discretion. Indeed, only one literature review to date has examined managerial discretion 
(Boyd & Gove, 2006). That review focuses solely on the measurement of discretion based upon Dess and Beard’s 
(1984) depiction of the task environment. We seek to more broadly examine managerial discretion research to 
advance understanding of discretion’s antecedents. Additionally, our review illustrates that research on the 
direct consequences of managerial discretion primarily focuses on executive compensation and firm 
performance. Since much of the research looking at the consequences of managerial discretion also focuses on 
the task environment, we feel there is tremendous opportunity to better understand the consequences from 
discretionary forces within an organization and from an executive’s psychological attributes. 
Coming more than 25 years after Hambrick and Finkelstein’s (1987) introduction of managerial discretion, we 
illustrate how the concept has progressed, been measured in studies, and where future research should address 
gaps in the field’s knowledge. We provide several contributions to the managerial discretion literature. First, we 
illustrate where research has identified value in the managerial discretion construct, while also illustrating 
where the initial construct remains untested. Second, we highlight opportunities for future research to extend 
the concept that will allow research on managerial discretion to continue progressing and provide greater 
influence. In particular, little research has focused on microconcepts, such as executive personality or cognition. 
Consideration of such topics may explain why some top executives perceive and act on opportunities or threats 
to the firm while others do not. 
In the remainder of this review, we provide background on managerial discretion and its theoretical 
underpinnings. Next, we summarize our review methodology. While many of managerial discretion’s concepts 
are applicable to divisional general managers and, in some cases, functional and middle managers, we focus on 
CEOs and top management team (TMT) members since almost all discretion research has been focused on top 
executives. We then review how managerial discretion has been used as an independent variable, as a 
dependent variable, and as a moderator and mediator to examine relationships between top managers and 
firm-level outcomes. Finally, we conclude with an analysis of gaps in managerial discretion research and 
recommend future research directions. 
Historical Background of the Managerial Discretion Construct 
As noted earlier, managerial discretion is the latitude of action, or potential strategic options, afforded to 
executives. While Hambrick and Finkelstein (1987) developed the seminal managerial discretion model 
employed in management research, the concept existed in several forms for many years prior to their article. 
Sociology, for instance, offers a comparable view of managerial discretion. Lieberson and O’Connor 
(1972)argued that the leadership effect in organizations accounts for variance in organizational performance, 
but that organizational progress and success over time are shaped by the leader’s traits and constrained by the 
organization’s characteristics and environment. In their study, Lieberson and O’Connor empirically examined 
positions in prior research arguing that in complex organizations there are a multitude of forces that constrain or 
magnify a leader’s effect (Guest, 1962; Thompson, 1967). They found that managers act in a substantially 
differing role in affecting organizational performance across industries and organizations, with the quality of 
management having less effect on established companies and a greater effect in new or recently merged 
organizations. 
Managerial discretion acts as a bridge between two previously conflicting organizational theories: population 
ecology and strategic choice (Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1987). Population ecology theorists argue that 
organizations are inertial and limited by internal and external pressures (Hannan & Freeman, 1977). Internal 
pressures include nontransferable personnel and investments in plant and equipment, while external pressures 
include legal and fiscal entry and exit barriers, constraints on available information, and a need for legitimacy 
within the organization’s domain. Conversely, strategic choice theorists argue that management’s chosen 
strategies shape organizational outcomes (Andrews, 1971). Managers determine long-term goals and objectives 
and implement courses of action (such as diversifying or discontinuing current activities) to pursue these goals 
and objectives (Chandler, 1962). Decision makers (i.e., the dominant coalition) have a “strategic choice” to 
implement structural change, determine the environmental domain in which to compete, and alter performance 
standards (Child, 1972). 
Hambrick and Finklestein’s (1987) managerial discretion model reconciles these conflicting views by recognizing 
that many forces act on a continuum. A manager’s latitude of action can be constrained or enabled depending 
on the degree to which each force exists. For example, CEOs with an internal locus of control pursue more 
innovation and undertake greater risks, while CEOs with an external locus of control are more likely to follow 
competitors (Miller, Kets De Vries, & Toulouse, 1982). Furthermore, strategic choice can be limited by inertial 
forces and the need for incremental action and internal consistency (Mintzberg, 1978). 
In their development of the managerial discretion construct, Hambrick and Finkelstein (1987) focus on three 
forces that determine an executive’s latitude of action: the task environment, internal organizational factors, 
and managerial characteristics. While all managers are decision makers and are influenced by such factors, a 
substantial majority of empirical work to support and advance the concept of managerial discretion has been 
focused on whether and how factors affect the CEO’s latitude of action. Before analyzing this research, we 
briefly discuss the three managerial discretion forces and the factors within each force. 
Task Environment 
The task environment is characterized by factors in the organization’s domain (e.g., industry) and how the 
organization functions within its domain. Since the task environment alters managerial discretion, managers 
have substantially differing roles in affecting organizational performance across industries. The task 
environment is expected to positively influence managerial discretion when product or service characteristics 
vary greatly across industry competitors, the market for the industry’s products or services is growing, and 
demand for the industry’s products or services is volatile. Conversely, the task environment may constrain 
discretion when an industry is highly concentrated, highly regulated, and powerful external forces, such as 
competitors, suppliers, and buyers, exist (Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1987; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Porter, 
1980; Thompson, 1967). Relatedly, Dess and Beard (1984) introduced munificence, dynamism, and complexity 
as dimensions of the task environment relevant to industry firms. Many of the managerial discretion task 
environment factors closely resemble these three dimensions (Boyd & Gove, 2006), and it is reasonable to 
conclude that industry munificence, dynamism, and complexity all potentially increase a manager’s latitude of 
action. 
Internal Organization 
Internal organizational factors influenced by inertial forces, powerful internal stakeholders, and resource 
availability are the second force shaping discretion. The internal organization defines the degree to which the 
organization is amenable to a variety of possible actions and subsequently empowers the CEO to execute those 
actions (Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1987). Inertial forces include an organization’s size, age, and culture. 
Indeed, Hannan and Freeman (1984) argue that highly inertial organizations change their core features at a 
much slower rate than environmental conditions in their domain change (Kelly & Amburgey, 1991). Thus, an 
executive seeking to initiate change can be severely constrained by the ingrained culture of a larger or older 
organization as a result of standardized routines or more formally defined roles and control systems (Hannan & 
Freeman; Quinn & Cameron, 1983). 
Relatedly, powerful internal stakeholders that are linked to the status quo may resist or even work against 
change. Individuals and groups may derive power from their ability to cope with contingencies related to the 
status quo and, thus, prioritize retaining the firm’s existing structure (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Tushman & 
Romanelli, 1985). Powerful stakeholders can perceive a potential loss of expert power and informational power 
in the organization’s current strategy and domain (French & Raven, 1959) but also may perceive a loss of 
legitimate, coercive, or referent power as a result of the executive’s impending actions (Boeker, 1997; Nutt, 
1989).1 
Capital intensity and resource availability can also constrain or enable a manager’s latitude of action. 
Organizations that have made tremendous capital outlays are likely to be highly committed to their current 
course of actions (Hannan & Freeman, 1977) and potentially tied closely to their current products and processes 
(Hambrick & Macmillan, 1985). Conversely, executives in organizations with abundant transferable resources 
(e.g., cash reserves, unused debt capacity, and available managerial and technical talent) may pursue a broader 
array of options (Cyert & March, 1963; Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1987). Firms such as Google, Microsoft, and Intel 
currently have an abundance of available resources and are thus able to explore a wider range of strategic 
options. However, despite these firms having abundant available resources, executives in these firms likely 
confront bureaucracies and costs that constrain their discretion, illustrating the complex interaction of 
organizational discretionary forces. 
Managerial Characteristics and Psychological Microfoundations 
A top manager’s psychological characteristics and their relationship with the firm can also limit or enhance the 
degree to which the executive can envision and create multiple courses of action across various contexts 
(Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1987). In advancing strategic choice theory, Child (1997) argued that executives in the 
same environmental situation will set different levels of discretion for themselves on the basis of their 
interpersonal linkage to the environment. A top manager’s tolerance for ambiguity, locus of control, and ability 
to deal with cognitive complexity compose the psychology-based personal characteristics in this force. 
Attributes of the top manager’s relationship with the firm, including his or her power base and commitment to 
the status quo, are also included in defining personal characteristics affecting discretion. 
The psychological microfoundations of managerial discretion are unique among the three factors influencing 
latitude of action because they are not determined by external forces. As an example, let us consider locus of 
control where the “external” person believes that events and outcomes are beyond their control and attributes 
subsequent performance to luck or destiny (Rotter, 1966). In contrast, an “internal” person believes that events 
and outcomes are primarily under his or her own control (Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1987). While we might expect 
that a CEO would always have an internal locus of control, multiple studies have found that this is not the 
case. Miller et al. (1982) were among the first to link a CEO’s behavior to performance, finding that more 
internal CEOs tended to pursue more innovation, take greater risks, and follow strategies different from industry 
competitors. More recently, Carpenter and Golden (1997) found that top managers with an internal locus of 
control had more discretion and that top managers who exhibited greater discretion were able to increase their 
perceived power within the organization. Similar connections can be made between other psychological 
constructs and managerial characteristics that influence managerial discretion (such as domain-specific self-
efficacy and confidence). In short, executives’ characteristics will influence the degree to which they see the 
need for action and take such action. 
Having reviewed the foundational theories and concepts from Hambrick and Finkelstein’s (1987) managerial 
discretion model, we now provide a comprehensive review of empirical studies examining one or more forces in 
the model. 
Review of Managerial Discretion Research 
Method 
The objective of our review was to examine articles that operationalized managerial discretion in top 
journals2 or other highly cited articles. We sought articles that were empirical in nature and specific to CEO or 
TMT discretion. This review was limited to empirical studies to examine research designed to test the 
managerial discretion construct. 
Using Google Scholar, we searched specifically for the term “managerial discretion” or variants of the term, such 
as “industry discretion,” in each top journal. We searched for the 100 most relevant articles from each top 
journal that applied aspects of the Hambrick and Finkelstein (1987) model or developed and examined 
additional factors affecting discretion, such as isomorphic pressure (Hambrick, Finkelstein, Cho, & Jackson, 2004) 
and national culture (Crossland & Chen, 2013).3 This process yielded over 500 articles. To find highly cited 
articles not in the top journals, we used Google Scholar to search specifically for the 100 most cited articles 
citing Hambrick and Finkelstein. This process yielded an additional 21 articles. 
All of the articles were then reviewed to determine whether they should be included in our literature review 
tables. First, we found that the managerial discretion term has been used in many articles as a convenient 
theoretical hook. Often managerial discretion is used as a passing term to justify why it is important to examine 
top managers or firm actions without directly examining the sources, consequences, or moderating and 
mediating effects of managerial discretion. Articles not really focused on managerial discretion were filtered out 
because they did not operationalize the managerial discretion construct. Second, since our objective was to 
include articles that were empirical in nature and specific to CEO or TMT discretion, we filtered out all articles 
that did not operationalize managerial discretion. Third, each remaining article was then reviewed in detail to 
determine whether the article substantially operationalized managerial discretion specific to the CEO or TMT, 
with substantial operationalization defined as empirical studies focused solely on one or more aspects of the 
managerial discretion construct, studies that operationalized two or more hypotheses developed from or prior 
to Hambrick and Finkelstein (1987), or studies that developed and examined additional factors affecting 
discretion.4 This process yielded the 45 articles that are included in our literature review. 
Our review and synthesis of the empirical research on managerial discretion suggested that each of the 45 
studies identified that operationalize managerial discretion could be classified into one or more of three distinct 
groups representing different approaches to modeling managerial discretion. Four articles modeled antecedents 
of managerial discretion, 26 used measures of managerial discretion as independent variables to show the 
consequences of managerial discretion, and 19 examined managerial discretion as a moderator or mediator 
variable between other executive-controlled antecedents and firm-level outcomes. 
Studies Examining the Antecedents of Managerial Discretion 
Determining whether the expected aspects of the three forces truly yield discretion is vital to validating the 
managerial discretion construct. Table 1 details the four studies that model managerial discretion as a 
dependent variable. Two studies used survey measurements of perceived managerial discretion as an outcome 
measure. In a food industry simulation, Carpenter and Golden (1997) surveyed master of business 
administration students with 15 items on perceived discretion, finding an external locus of control to be 
negatively related to perceived discretion, while Key (2002) surveyed managers in manufacturing and service 
industry firms, finding that an external locus of control was associated with lower perceived discretion only in 
low discretion situations. Hambrick and Abrahamson (1995) measured discretion using a panel of academics and 
analysts rating the level of managerial discretion in 17 industries. These discretion ratings were compared with 
objective measures of the task environment leading to the finding that market growth, R&D intensity, and 
advertising intensity were positively related and capital intensity was negatively related to discretion at the 
industry level. Additionally, the authors did not find a relationship between two task environment factors 
(demand instability and regulation) and discretion. 
Table 1 Articles Examining Antecedents of Managerial Discretion 
Managerial 
Discretion 
Force Used in 
Study 
Author(s) Methods or 
Measures Used 
to Represent 
Discretion 
Independent 
Variables 
Key Findings 
Managerial 
Characteristics 
Carpenter & 
Golden 
(1997) 
Food industry 
simulation 
executed with 
MBA students 
responding to 
15 survey items 
on perceived 
managerial 
discretion 
Locus of 
control, 
manager’s 
perception of 
discretion 
A more external locus of control was associated 
with managerial discretion perceptions in low 
discretion situations. Individuals’ perceptions of 
discretion tended to affect the power others 
attributed to them only in situations where the 
managers were purported to have little discretion. 
Task 
Environment 
and Internal 
Organization 
Hambrick & 
Abrahamson 
(1995) 
Panel of 
academics and 
analysts rated 
level of 
discretion in 17 
industries 
Product 
differentiability, 
growth, 
industry 
structure, 
demand 
instability, 
regulation, 
power of 
outside forces, 
capital intensity 
Three of six industry factors (R&D intensity, 
advertising intensity, and market growth) were 
positively related to discretion. Capital intensity 
was negatively related to discretion. Two factors 
(demand instability, regulation) were not related 
to discretion. 
 Hambrick, 
Finkelstein, 
Cho & 
Standard 
deviation over 
time of capital, 
Six macrosocial 
factors 
characterizing 
Isomorphism (the need to be like other firms in 
the industry) decreased over 40 years by finding 
significant standard deviation increases for capital 
Jackson 
(2004) 
advertising, 
and R & D 
intensity for 
the industry by 
year 
isomorphic 
pressure by 
year 
intensity, advertising intensity, and R&D intensity. 
Similar findings were noted for 18 additional 
industries tested 
Internal 
Organization 
and 
Managerial 
Characteristics 
Key (2002) Survey of 
managers 
focusing on 
perceived 
discretion 
regarding 
ethical 
intentions of 
other managers 
in the firm 
Individual and 
organizational 
demographic 
variables, loss 
of control, firm 
having an 
ethical 
organizational 
culture 
Manager’s external locus of control was negatively 
related to perceived discretion. Presence of an 
ethical culture was positively related to perceived 
discretion. Individual and organizational 
demographic variables did not predict perceived 
discretion. Interaction of all independent variables 
accounted for only 0.1% of additional variance of 
perceived managerial discretion. 
Note: MBA = master of business administration. 
Hambrick et al. (2004) considered isomorphic pressure as an additional external factor, finding that decreased 
isomorphism in the steel industry increased discretion. They replicated these findings for the 20 largest firms 
from 18 additional industries. 
Figure 1 summarizes findings of research on managerial discretion’s antecedents. Given the small number of 
studies, it is not surprising that many of the factors in task environment and internal organization have not been 
studied or, in the cases of demand instability, regulation, and firm size, no support was found from a single 
study. Additionally, many psychological factors (including ambiguity tolerance, cognitive complexity, and 
aspiration level) and the manager’s power base and political acumen have yet to be empirically examined. 
Furthermore, it is apparent that researchers have struggled to measure discretion. Two articles used survey 
methods to measure perceived managerial discretion, one article (Hambrick & Abrahamson, 1995) used a panel 
of academics and analysts to measure discretion at the industry level, and one article (Hambrick et al., 2004) 
measured discretion using industry task environment factors to build a composite measure of industry-level 
managerial discretion. In short, limited research has focused on examining the antecedents and measurement of 
the managerial discretion construct. 
 
Figure 1 Summary of Results of the Antecedents of Managerial Discretion 
Note: Factors in bold have been found to significantly affect managerial discretion; underlined factors have been 
empirically tested but no significant support has been found; italicized factors have not been empirically tested 
with managerial discretion as a dependent variable. Plus and minus signs indicate factors increasing and 
decreasing managerial discretion, respectively. Adapted from Hambrick and Finkelstein (1987) and Finkelstein, 
Hambrick, and Cannella (2009). 
Studies Examining Consequences of Managerial Discretion 
If leaders do indeed matter, then the discretion held by CEO and TMT members should affect performance and 
organizational effectiveness. Table 2 provides a summary of articles examining the consequences of managerial 
discretion, while Figure 2 illustrates how studies have examined managerial discretion’s influence on various 
outcomes. We identified 25 studies that used managerial discretion as an independent variable and that utilized 
measures from the task environment, internal organization, or managerial characteristics to assess the effects of 
discretion. Of the 25 studies identified, 3 studies examined task environment and internal organization within 
the same study, while 1 study examined both task environment and managerial characteristics. Finally, 4 studies 
addressed an additional force and its effect on firm-level outcomes: the institutional environment, emphasizing 
how nationality-based factors enable or constrain managers. 
Table 2 Articles Examining the Consequences of Managerial Discretion 
Managerial 
Discretion 
Force Used in 
Study 
Author(s) Method for 
Measuring 
Managerial 
Discretion 
Dependent Variables Key Findings 
Task 
Environment 
Abrahamson 
& Hambrick 
(1997) 
Panel of 
academics and 
analysts rated 14 
industries 
Attentional 
homogeneity (from 
content analysis) 
There are significant negative 
correlations between industry discretion 
and lexical commonality and lexical 
density measures of attention 
homogeneity. Industries with less 
discretion have more attentional 
homogeneity among different firms’ top 
managers. 
 Datta & 
Rajagopalan 
(1998) 
Industry capital 
intensity and 
growth, product 
differentiation 
Organizational tenure, 
executive age, 
education level, 
throughput functional 
background, firm 
performance 
Advertising intensity was negatively 
related with organizational tenure and 
throughput background and positively 
related to education level. Industry 
growth rate was negatively related with 
organizational tenure and age. Industry 
capital intensity was shown to have a 
weak relationship with throughput 
background. Firms with greater 
postsuccession performance 
improvements appeared to match CEO 
successor characteristics more closely to 
industry conditions. 
 Finkelstein 
& Boyd 
(1998) 
Growth, R&D, 
advertising and 
capital intensity, 
demand 
instability, 
concentration, 
regulation 
CEO compensation Managerial discretion is positively 
related to CEO compensation. This 
relationship was shown to be much 
stronger for high performers versus low 
performers. 
 Finkelstein 
(2009) 
Growth, R&D, 
advertising and 
capital intensity, 
demand 
instability, 
concentration, 
regulation 
CEO compensation, 
performancecontingent 
compensation 
Discretion was modeled as a construct 
using the independent variables as 
indicators. For both compensation 
dependent variables, discretion was 
significantly related to compensation. 
Concentration and demand instability 
were the only two factors not 
significantly related to discretion. 
 Graffin, 
Carpenter, 
& Boivie 
(2011) 
Growth, R&D, 
advertising and 
capital intensity, 
demand 
instability 
 
Likelihood of a “noisy” 
CEO succession 
Firm-related managerial discretion was 
not significantly related to the likelihood 
of a noisy CEO succession event. 
 Hambrick & 
Quigley 
(2014) 
Discretion ratings 
for each industry 
using Hambrick 
and Abrahamson 
(1995) 
CEO effect on variance 
in ROA on the basis of 
new method 
Stronger CEO effect was shown overall 
and for low, medium, and high industry 
discretion subsamples using the CEO in 
context method. CEO in context method 
points to a much greater aggregate CEO 
effect. Effects are strongest for CEOs in 
high discretion industries and stronger in 
medium discretion industries than in low 
discretion industries. 
 Keegan & 
Kabanoff 
(2008) 
Attentional 
homogeneity 
(using lexical 
commonality and 
density) used as 
proxy for 
industry-level 
discretion 
Debt usage, significant 
account adjustments, 
disciplining effect of 
debt 
Industry-level discretion was negatively 
associated with industry debt usage. 
Firms in high discretion industries 
perform significant account adjustments 
more than firms in low discretion 
industries. When industry-level 
discretion is high, debt’s disciplining 
effects within an industry decrease. 
 Peteraf & 
Reed (2007) 
Data on airline 
cost function 
Cost function of various 
airlinespecific factors 
Managerial behavior changed when 
regulations were lifted; managers 
separated into 
regulated and 
deregulated 
periods 
choose more efficient strategies without 
regulation. Regulation restricted 
managerial choice of network structure 
in the presence of economies of network 
density and forced executives to choose 
strategies that had wasteful levels of 
quality in the form of costly meals and 
amenities. 
 Sahaym, 
Treviño, & 
Steensma 
(2012) 
Composite 
industry measure 
of task 
environment 
variables: growth, 
product 
differentiation, 
capital intensity, 
structure 
Industry exports 
measured as export 
intensity 
Higher managerial discretion leads to 
greater industry exports. When 
innovations or uncertainty are high, the 
effect of managerial discretion on 
industry exports is stronger. The 
relationship between managerial 
discretion and exports are weakest for 
industries where levels of innovation 
and uncertainty are low. 
Internal 
Organization 
Boyd & 
Salamin 
(2001) 
Strategic 
orientation from 
interviews and 
archival sources 
Compensation plan Strategic orientation affects the pay of 
all employees, not just top managers. 
Base pay is higher with change-oriented 
strategies. Bonus pay and bonus pay–to–
base pay ratio are also higher with 
changed-oriented strategies but only at 
upper levels of hierarchy. 
 Kim (2013) CEO duality; 
percent of inside 
directors 
Entry by an 
independent power 
producer into the 
renewable generation 
market 
Weak support for CEO duality increasing 
likelihood of market entry. CEO duality 
(greater discretion) with a higher 
presence of independent power 
producers in the market significantly 
increases the likelihood of market entry. 
Percent of inside directors (alone or with 
a higher presence of independent power 
producers) did not significantly affect 
the likelihood of market entry. 
 Quigley & 
Hambrick 
(2012) 
Each firm-year 
can be low 
discretion 
(predecessor CEO 
as board chair) or 
higher discretion 
(departure of CEO 
as board chair) 
Strategic change; firm 
performance 
Predecessor retention suppresses 
strategic change, which leads to 
diminished performance changes. When 
the predecessor CEO leaves as board 
chair, strategic change increases, 
resulting in greater performance 
changes. Predecessor retention as chair 
was significantly negatively related to 
resource reallocation, divestitures, and 
TMT departures. The 1st year that the 
successor CEO is free of the predecessor 
is positively related to resource 
reallocation, divestitures, and TMT 
turnover. Performance tends to be in 
line with presuccession performance 
when the predecessor is board chair, but 
there are large changes in performance 
once the predecessor departs. 
 Roth & 
O’Donnell 
(1996) 
Lateral 
centralization: 
directly stated to 
Subsidiary senior 
management pay mix, 
competitive positioning 
Subsidiaries with increasing degrees of 
lateral decentralization (greater 
discretion) have higher levels of 
increase 
managerial 
discretion of 
subsidiary 
management 
of executives’ pay, 
salary adjustment 
criteria 
incentive-based compensation or a 
greater mix of senior management pay. 
Market positioning of subsidiary’s 
executives’ salaries is positively related 
to lateral decentralization. 
 Singh & 
Harianto 
(1989) 
Nonmanagement-
owned stock 
constraining 
management’s 
ability to 
influence a board 
Likelihood of adopting 
a golden parachute 
Higher concentration of stock ownership 
in nonmanagement hands (decreased 
discretion) reduces the likelihood that a 
board adopts a golden parachute. 
 Werner & 
Tosi (1995) 
Firm ownership 
structure; 
management 
controlled 
(highest 
discretion 
structure), 
designated for 
firms not having 
greater than 5% 
ownership by an 
individual or 
organization 
Pay-level policy, pay 
differentiation 
Base pay and bonus of managers in 
owner-controlled and ownermanaged 
firms (lower discretion) was significantly 
lower than in management-controlled 
firms. Change in performance was 
related to the change in base salary and 
bonus for ownercontrolled firms but not 
for management-controlled firms. 
Change in size was not significantly 
related to change in base and bonus for 
any organizational structure. 
Managementcontrolled firms made 
greater use of long-term incentives. 
Owner-managed firms have significantly 
greater percentages of bonus-eligible 
employees than management-controlled 
firms. Management-controlled firms had 
significantly higher bonus pay–to–base 
pay ratio and bonus pay than 
ownercontrolled or owner-managed 
firms. 
Managerial 
Characteristics 
McClelland, 
Liang, & 
Barker 
(2010) 
Dummy variables 
for low and high 
discretion; 
groupings 
selected based on 
previous research 
and validated 
using R&D, 
advertising and 
capital intensity, 
growth 
CEO CSQ; future firm 
performance 
CEO CSQ associated with industry-level 
managerial discretion but only in low 
discretion industries. CEO CSQ 
associated with lower future accounting 
performance in high discretion 
industries. No support found for lower 
industry discretion moderating the 
relationship between CEO CSQ and 
accounting performance. For market 
performance (Tobin’s Q), CEO CSQ in low 
discretion industries has a positive 
moderating effect, while CEO CSQ in 
high discretion industries has a negative 
moderating effect. 
 Miller, Kets 
De Vries, & 
Toulouse 
(1982) 
Via interview to 
obtain a locus of 
control score for 
CEO (24 of 33 
firms) and TMT 
(all 33 firms) 
Aggregate innovation, 
risk taking, 
proactiveness, and 
planning horizon all via 
interview 
Innovation, risk taking, proactiveness, 
and planning horizon in all firms were 
significantly correlated to an internal 
locus of control (greater discretion). 
Innovation and internal locus of control 
were not significantly correlated for 
lower tenure executives. For executives 
in small firms, locus of control was 
significantly correlated with innovation, 
risk taking, proactiveness, and having a 
planning horizon. However, executives’ 
locus of control was significantly 
correlated only with proactiveness in 
large firms. 
 Roth (1992) Decision-making 
factors; risk 
taking; openness 
ROA and sales growth Risk-taking behavior by TMT members 
significantly related to ROA more in a 
multidomestic strategy than a global 
strategy. No support for openness in 
decision making having a greater impact 
on firm performance between business 
units following a multidomestic strategy 
versus a global strategy. 
Task 
Environment 
and 
Managerial 
Characteristics 
Adams, 
Almeida, & 
Ferreira 
(2005) 
CEO power to 
influence 
decisions via 
three dummy 
measures; 
industry 
discretion via 
Hambrick and 
Abrahamson 
(1995) 
Variability of stock 
returns, Tobin’s Q, and 
ROA for 1992 to 1999 
Retention of the CEO title by one of the 
founders is the most consistent variable 
affecting performance variability, but 
there is some evidence that the other 
two measures of CEO power (CEO’s 
concentration of titles and CEO as the 
only board insider) are positively related 
to performance variability. All three 
measures of CEO power have a stronger 
positive effect on performance 
variability in high discretion industries. 
Task 
Environment 
and Internal 
Organization 
 
Papadakis & 
Bourantas 
(1998) 
Environmental 
dynamism via 
CEO/TMT survey 
responses on 
frequency of 
environmental 
changes; firm size 
Firms’ innovation 
position in industry 
Environmental dynamism significantly 
related to major product innovation. 
Both environmental dynamism and firm 
size related to incremental product 
innovation. 
 Rajagopalan 
& 
Finkelstein 
(1992) 
Strategic 
orientation via 
CEO survey: 
innovation, 
efficiency, 
domain 
expansion; 
uncertainty 
deemed lower 
prior to 1978 and 
higher after 1983 
CEO compensation, 
CEO salary, CEO annual 
bonus, and average 
executive team cash 
compensation 
Prospector firms, presumed to have the 
highest discretion, had higher executive 
pay. Defenders have higher overall 
executive pay than reactors. Prospectors 
have higher outcome-based 
compensation than other typologies and 
have a greater proportion of 
compensation based on outcomes. 
During periods of uncertainty, 
executives have higher overall 
compensation, more outcome-based 
compensation, and a higher proportion 
of cash compensation based on 
outcomes. 
 Wasserman, 
Anand, & 
Nohria 
(2010) 
Opportunity 
scarcity; industry 
growth; resource 
availability 
CEO effect based on 
Tobin’s Q 
In industries more highly concentrated 
or constrained by external relationships, 
companies have fewer opportunities to 
act and, thus, the CEO impact is larger. 
When industry growth is low, 
opportunities are scarce and the CEO 
effect is high. CEOs have less impact on 
performance when opportunities are 
plentiful and when debt levels and 
servicing requirements are high. When 
slack is high, CEOs can proactively take 
advantage of opportunities that may 
change company performance. 
Institutional 
Environment 
Crossland & 
Hambrick 
(2007) 
Three countries 
classified using 
Hofstede’s 
typology 
emphasizing 
individualism 
versus 
collectivism and 
uncertainty 
avoidance 
 
Firm performance via 
ROA, ROS, sales 
growth, market to book 
Performance variance explained by the 
CEO was consistently greater in the U.S. 
sample than in the German or Japanese 
samples. Countries with lower 
constraints, presumed to impart greater 
discretion upon executives, increase the 
CEO’s effect on firm performance 
outcomes. 
 Crossland & 
Hambrick 
(2011) 
Country-level 
rating of 
managerial 
discretion via 
surveys from 
expert panel 
Firm performance via 
ROA, ROIC, ROS, MTB 
National-level of discretion was a 
significant predictor of national-level 
CEO effects (i.e., the amount of variance 
in firm performance attributable to CEO-
level factors), suggesting that nations 
with a greater level of discretion have 
firms with greater CEO effects. 
 Gedajlovic & 
Shapiro 
(1998) 
Ownership 
concentration; 
nationality-based 
constraints 
Firm profitability For U.S. and German firms, typified by 
external constraints, ownership 
concentration was related to 
profitability. In France (typified by 
internal constraints), United Kingdom 
(typified by external constraints), and 
Canada (typified by both internal and 
external constraints), no relationship 
was found between ownership 
concentration and profitability 
 Makhija & 
Stewart 
(2002) 
Survey results 
from four 
questions on 
perceptions of 
government 
control; 
discretion 
deemed low for 
United States and 
high for Czech 
Republic 
Organizational 
accountability; 
decision-making 
orientation  
Managers in more free market–oriented 
countries perceive more outcome 
accountability, are more comfortable 
with uncertainty, and have a stronger 
sense of power over decision outcomes 
than managers in planned institutional 
environments. A decision-making 
orientation that reflects a greater 
comfort with uncertainty and a sense of 
power over decision outcomes leads to 
greater risk taking, while greater 
perceived organizational accountability 
leads to less risk taking. 
Note: ROA = return on assets; TMT = top management team; CSQ = commitment to the status quo; ROS = return 
on sales; ROIC = return on invested capital; MTB = manage to budget. 
 
Figure 2 Summary of the Consequences of Managerial Discretion 
Note: Plus and minus signs indicate outcomes increased and decreased by managerial discretion, respectively. 
The managerial discretion model argues that when a CEO’s ability to influence decisions is high, his or her effect 
on firm-level outcomes is greater. Several studies find support for this notion. For instance, Hambrick and 
Quigley (2014) devise a new method to predict CEO effects on firm performance and divide their sample into 
high, medium, and low discretion industries. The authors find that in industries with greater discretion, CEOs 
have a greater effect on performance, with their “CEO in context” method pointing to a much greater aggregate 
CEO effect than shown previously. These results are consistent with prior studies examining the relationship 
between discretion from CEO power and performance variability, finding that discretion from CEO power is 
positively related to performance variability (e.g., Adams, Almeida, & Ferreira, 2005). Using nation-level 
measures of discretion, Crossland and Hambrick (2007) find that CEOs in countries with fewer institutional 
constraints have a greater effect on firm performance. In a follow-up study, the authors find that national-level 
discretion is a predictor of national-level CEO effects, whereby nations with greater discretion have greater CEO 
effects (Crossland & Hambrick, 2011). Alternatively, Wasserman, Anand, and Nohria (2010) find that a scarcity of 
opportunities to act, due to high industry concentration or low industry growth, increases a CEO’s effect on 
Tobin’s Q. In short, studies provide greater support for the notion that discretion increases CEO effects on firm 
performance; however, this may be based on how the level of discretion is measured. Despite these findings, 
only one study has explored how managerial characteristics influence CEO effects on firm performance. 
The second most commonly studied outcome of managerial discretion is compensation. Using a variety of task 
environment factors as proxies for discretion, studies show that higher discretion yields greater CEO 
compensation (Finkelstein, 2009; Rajagopalan & Finkelstein, 1992), and such effects are stronger for high 
performing CEOs (Finkelstein & Boyd, 1998). Examining internal factors, Roth and O’Donnell (1996) find that 
decentralized foreign subsidiaries have a higher degree of incentive pay, while Werner and Tosi (1995) find that 
owner-controlled and owner-managed firms have lower base and bonus pay for executives. Finally, a firm’s 
strategic orientation has been shown to affect the pay of all employees, as firms with change-oriented strategies 
have higher base and bonus pay (Boyd & Salamin, 2001). These findings are significant, as greater discretion 
indicates a need for a higher quality manager to choose proper strategic choices, increasing the level of 
compensation that executives receive. 
A third important set of outcomes examined relates to firm strategic behavior. In an early study, Miller and 
colleagues (1982) find that innovation, risk taking, proactiveness, and planning horizon were all correlated to an 
internal locus of control, a managerial characteristic that increases discretion. Kim (2013) finds that CEO duality, 
a measure of CEO power that increases discretion, increases the likelihood of market entry. McClelland, Liang, 
and Barker (2010) find that discretion significantly influences a CEO’s commitment to the status quo. Industry 
factors (low discretion industries), internal factors (smaller organizations), and managerial demographics (older 
executives) all lead to greater commitment to the status quo. Examining an institutional measure of 
discretion, Makhija and Stewart (2002) find that managers in free market–oriented countries engage in greater 
risk taking. Consistent with these studies, results from Quigley and Hambrick (2012) show that an internal factor 
relating to a powerful force, the retention of a prior CEO on the board, limits the amount of strategic change 
that happens under a new CEO. The retention of the predecessor as board chair results in less resource 
reallocation, fewer divestitures, and fewer TMT departures, suggesting that allowing a prior CEO to remain as 
board chair significantly decreases the discretion of a new CEO. In short, findings suggest that proxies for 
discretion are related to the level of organizational risk taking, innovation, and strategic change. 
Our review of the literature on the consequences of discretion suggests that the four factors of discretion tested 
strongly relate to CEO effects on performance outcomes, the level and mix of CEO compensation, and firm 
strategic behavior. Despite these studies, only a small number of studies examine alternative consequences, 
such as level of debt usage (Keegan & Kabanoff, 2008), corporate governance (Singh & Harianto, 1989), industry 
attention patterns (Abrahamson & Hambrick, 1997), CEO characteristics (Datta & Rajagopalan, 1998), and 
efficiency of organizational strategies (Peteraf & Reed, 2007). Future research could focus on new, significant 
organizational decisions likely to be affected by the level of discretion. 
We also found that over half of the 25 studies examining discretion’s consequences used archival data to 
measure discretion. Nine of these studies used a combination of measures from the Hambrick and Finkelstein 
(1987) task environment force. With a small set of studies using other measurement methodologies, such as 
attentional homogeneity via content analysis (Abrahamson & Hambrick, 1997) or industry changes from a 
deregulating event (Peteraf & Reed, 2007), a reasonably robust set of measures exists for the task environment 
force. However, all but 2 studies examining the consequences of managerial discretion from organizational 
forces use archival data to measure discretion. This has limited our understanding of how organizational forces 
of discretion affect outcomes since only readily available factors (e.g., CEO duality) have been examined. 
Challenges associated with using nonarchival methods also seem to have limited the study of the consequences 
of an executive’s psychological traits, as only 4 of the 25 studies have measured managerial discretion using 
executives’ psychological traits. Future research using alternative methods (e.g., surveys, interviews, and 
content analysis) would greatly enhance our understanding of how organizational culture and powerful inside 
forces may constrain an executive and our understanding of the consequences of discretion. 
Studies Examining Managerial Discretion as a Mediator or Moderator 
While discretion is theorized to directly affect a number of outcomes, many studies have focused on discretion 
as an important moderator or mediator between strategy variables and firm outcomes. Table 3presents the 19 
studies we have identified that utilize managerial discretion as either a moderator or mediator, while Figure 
3 pictorially identifies how studies have theorized that discretion may mediate or moderate important 
outcomes. Within these 19 studies, only 4 have utilized managerial discretion as a mediating variable, while the 
other 15 have used discretion as a moderator. 
Table 3 Articles Using Managerial Discretion as a Mediator or Moderator 
Managerial 
Discretion 
Force Used 
in Study 
Author(s) Managerial 
Discretion and 
Measure 
Usage 
Independ
ent 
Variables 
Dependent 
Variables 
Key Findings 
Task 
Environme
nt 
Datta, 
Guthrie, 
& Wright 
(2005) 
Moderator: 
industry 
capital 
intensity, 
growth, 
product 
differentiation
, dynamism 
HPWS Labor 
productivity 
(log of firm 
sales to total 
employees) 
Industry capital intensity, growth, and product 
differentiation all found to positively strengthen 
the relationship between HPWS and labor 
productivity. No significant effect was found for 
industry dynamism as a moderator between 
HPWS and labor productivity. 
 Goll, 
Johnson, 
& 
Rasheed 
(2008) 
Moderator: 
airline 
prederegulatio
n and 
postderegulati
on 
TMT age, 
tenure, 
educatio
n level, 
functiona
l 
diversity 
Business 
strategy 
(differentiati
on, cost 
leader, 
breadth of 
strategic 
scope) 
Environment exerts a moderating influence on 
the TMT demographics-strategy relationship in 
the deregulated industry but not the regulated 
industry. Younger and less tenured managers 
place marginally greater emphasis on 
differentiation during deregulation but also 
emphasize a low-cost strategy. Better educated 
executives place more emphasis on 
differentiation in the deregulated environment. 
TMTs with greater functional diversity emphasize 
low-cost strategies in deregulated environments. 
 Haleblian 
& 
Finkelstei
n (1993) 
Moderator: 
industry’s 
average 
advertising 
and R&D 
intensity and 
annual sales 
growth; 
standard 
deviation of 
annual sales 
growth; 
degree of 
regulation 
TMT size, 
CEO 
dominan
ce 
 
 
Firm 
performanc
e 
Team size and CEO dominance significantly 
related to firm performance when discretion in 
the task environment is high but not when 
discretion is low. 
 Hambric
k, 
Geletkan
ycz, & 
Fredricks
Moderator: 
three high 
discretion and 
three low 
discretion 
industries 
Organiza
tional 
performa
nce, 
organizat
ion and 
CSQ 
measured 
using 
executive 
surveys 
Strong current performance was positively 
related to CSQ for leadership and strategy. 
Executives in high discretion situations, but not 
those in low discretion situations, interpret poor 
performance as a signal that an organization 
needs to change. Current performance and CSQ 
on 
(1993) 
industry 
tenure 
are more strongly related in high discretion 
industries than in low discretion industries. 
 Lieberso
n & 
O’Conno
r (1972) 
Moderator: 
variance 
explained by 
administration 
after year and 
company 
effects are 
removed 
Year 
effect, 
industry 
effect, 
company 
effect, 
administr
ation 
effect 
Sales, net 
earnings, 
profit 
margin 
Administrative effect on sales varies only on the 
degree of industry concentration. Profit margins 
affected by management when: industries have 
low labor intensity or where worker pay is a 
smaller part of total employment costs, industry 
is growing, advertising is important, consumers 
form a sizable market, TMT is larger 
 Magnan 
& St. 
Onge 
(1997) 
Moderator: 
sum of five 
binary 
variables for 
distinct 
dimensions of 
discretion 
Bank 
performa
nce: 
ROA, 
stock 
market 
return 
Total CEO 
compensati
on 
Managerial discretion positively influences the 
strength of the relationship between bank 
performance and executive compensation. Each 
individual dimension of managerial discretion 
moderates the relationship between bank 
performance and executive compensation. 
 Messers
mith, 
Lee, 
Guthrie, 
& Li 
(2013) 
Moderator: 
industry 
instability; 
industry 
munificence 
and 
complexity 
TMT 
turnover 
Firm 
performanc
e  
Industry sales growth positively moderated the 
relationship between TMT turnover and firm 
performance, contrary to predictions. No 
significant moderating effects from industry 
complexity or instability were found. 
Internal 
Organizatio
n 
J. T. 
Campbell
, 
Campbell
, Sirmon, 
Bierman, 
& Tuggle 
(2012) 
Moderator: 
spline function 
used to 
classify firms 
between low 
and high 
discretion 
based on net 
PP&E/ 
employees 
CEO 
discretio
n 
Shareholder 
value 
change on 
the day of 
the 
announcem
ent of a new 
SEC proxy 
access rule 
Abnormal shareholder returns from the 
announcement of a new SEC proxy access rule 
were positive and significant for low and high 
discretion but significantly larger for firms in high 
discretion industries. 
 Preston, 
Chen, & 
Leidner 
(2008) 
Mediator: CIO 
and other TMT 
member 
responses on 
CIO strategic 
decision-
making 
authority 
Organiza
tional 
decision-
making 
climate, 
support 
for IT; 
CIO 
effective
ness, 
structura
l power; 
CIO/TMT 
partners
hip 
IT 
contribution 
via survey 
responses 
from TMT 
members 
CIO strategic decision-making authority found to 
significantly mediate the relationship between 
organizational climate, organizational support 
for IT, CIO structural power, CIO strategic 
effectiveness, and CIO’s partnership with other 
TMT members and IT’s contribution to firm 
performance. 
 Quigley 
& 
Hambric
k (2012) 
Mediator: 
each year can 
be low 
discretion 
(predecessor 
Predeces
sor CEO 
retained, 
1st free 
year 
Strategic 
change; firm 
performanc
e 
Predecessor retention suppresses strategic 
change, leading to diminished performance 
changes. When the predecessor CEO leaves as 
board chair, strategic change increases, resulting 
in greater performance changes. Predecessor 
CEO as board 
chair) or 
higher 
discretion 
(departure of 
CEO as board 
chair) 
retention as chair was significantly negatively 
related to resource reallocation, divestitures, 
and TMT departures. The 1st year that the 
successor CEO is “free” of the predecessor is 
positively related to resource reallocation, 
divestitures, and TMT turnover. Performance 
tends to be in line with presuccession 
performance when the predecessor is board 
chair, but large changes in performance occur 
once the predecessor departs. 
 Rajagopa
lan 
(1997) 
Moderator: 
survey of 
senior 
executives on 
strategic 
orientation 
Annual 
bonus 
plan, 
long-
term 
performa
nce plan, 
stock 
option 
plan 
Return on 
capital, 
stock price 
return 
 
Strong support for incentive plans including cash 
and stock rewards associated with better firm 
performance for prospectors. Most annual 
bonus or long-term plans did not show 
association with better firm performance for 
defenders. 
Managerial 
Characteris
tics 
Buchholt
z, 
Amason, 
& 
Rutherfo
rd (1999) 
Mediator: 
survey 
response from 
CEOs on 
discretion for 
decisions 
regarding 
charitable 
contributions; 
validated 
discretion 
versus 14 
other business 
discretion 
items 
Firm 
resource
s via 
survey 
validated 
using 
financial 
performa
nce from 
archival 
data 
Corporate 
philanthrop
y measured 
via survey 
responses 
Availability of firm resources significantly affects 
the amount of corporate philanthropy. When 
managerial discretion related to charitable 
contributions was added, the results supported 
full mediation of firm resources and corporate 
philanthropy by managerial discretion. When the 
TMT’s values related to charitable contributions 
was added, the effect of managerial values was 
shown to be moderately significant while the 
effect of managerial discretion was no longer 
significant, supporting partial mediation of 
managerial discretion and corporate 
philanthropy by the values of the TMT. 
 Dollinger
, Golden, 
& Saxton 
(1997) 
Moderator: 
MBA student 
survey 
responses on 
tolerance for 
ambiguity and 
locus of 
control 
Firm 
reputatio
n 
 
 
 
Approval of 
alliance with 
competitor 
or supplier 
Individuals with high tolerance ambiguity or with 
internal locus of control were more likely to 
suppress both the most positive and most 
negative reputation information in alliance 
decision. 
 Geletkan
ycz & 
Hambric
k (1997) 
Moderator: 
intraindustry 
and 
extraindustry 
ties 
Absolute 
differenc
es of 
strategic 
indicator
s for 
each firm 
versus 
industry 
means 
ROA, ROS Weak support for moderating effects of hiring 
executives in the same industry and no support 
for trade association ties as a moderator 
between strategic indicators and firm 
performance. Hiring executives from outside the 
firm’s industry and TMTs serving on other firms’ 
boards found to moderate the relationship 
between strategy and firm performance. 
Directors outside the firm’s industry had an 
unexpected negative moderating effect on firm 
performance. No significant moderating effect 
found from professional association ties. 
Task 
Environme
nt and 
Internal 
Organizatio
n 
Finkelstei
n & 
Hambric
k (1990) 
Moderator: 
three sample 
industries 
(high, 
medium, low) 
TMT 
member 
tenure, 
firm size, 
immedia
te slack, 
firm 
performa
nce 
Strategic 
persistence 
and 
conformity; 
performanc
e conformity 
The associations between team tenure and 
strategic conformity and persistence are 
stronger in the high discretion computer industry 
than in the medium and low discretion 
industries. The association between team tenure 
and performance conformity was significantly 
positive for the high discretion industry but 
significantly negative for the medium discretion 
industry. 
Task 
Environme
nt and 
Managerial 
Characteris
tics 
Adams, 
Almeida, 
& 
Ferreira 
(2005) 
Moderator: 
CEO power to 
influence 
decisions; 
industry 
discretion via 
Hambrick and 
Abrahamson 
(1995) 
CEO 
power to 
influence 
decisions 
Variability of 
stock 
returns, 
Tobin’s Q, 
and ROA 
CEO title retention by one of the founders is the 
most consistent variable affecting performance 
variability, but there is some evidence that CEO’s 
concentration of titles and CEO as the only board 
insider are also positively related to performance 
variability. All three measures of CEO power 
have a stronger positive effect on performance 
variability in high discretion industries. 
 McClella
nd, 
Liang, & 
Barker 
(2010) 
Moderator: 
dummy 
variables for 
low and high 
discretion; 
groupings 
selected on 
the basis of 
previous 
research and 
validated 
using R&D, 
advertising 
and capital 
intensity, sales 
growth 
Member
ship in a 
low or 
high 
discretio
n 
industry; 
CEO CSQ 
via 
content 
analysis 
of CEO 
letters 
CEO CSQ; 
future firm 
performanc
e 
CEO CSQ associated with industry-level 
managerial discretion but only in low discretion 
industries. CEO CSQ is significantly associated 
with lower future accounting performance in 
high discretion industries. No support found for 
lower industry discretion moderating the 
relationship between CEO CSQ and accounting 
performance. For market performance (Tobin’s 
Q), CEO CSQ in low discretion industries has a 
positive moderating effect, while CEO CSQ in 
high discretion industries has a negative 
moderating effect. 
Institutiona
l 
Environme
nt 
Crosslan
d & Chen 
(2013) 
Moderator: 
country-level 
rating of 
managerial 
discretion via 
surveys from 
expert panel 
of analysts 
Firm 
performa
nce 
 
CEO 
dismissal/ 
succession 
For the six countries used in this study, the 
probability of dismissal due to poor performance 
varied for the six countries. Probability of 
dismissal due to poor performance was highest 
in the United States, followed (in order) by 
Canada, United Kingdom, France, Germany, and 
Japan. When the six countries are aggregated, 
the probability of dismissal when performance is 
poor is significantly higher when managerial 
discretion is high. 
 Crosslan
d & 
Hambric
k (2011) 
Moderator: 
country-level 
rating of 
managerial 
discretion via 
surveys from 
expert panel 
Individua
lism; 
uncertai
nty 
tolerance
; power 
distance; 
cultural 
loosenes
s; 
ownershi
Firm 
performanc
e 
 
 
 
Discretion fully mediated the relationship 
between uncertainty tolerance and CEO 
effectiveness. The effects of individualism, 
cultural looseness, ownership dispersion, and 
legal origin on CEO effectiveness were partially 
mediated by discretion. National level of 
discretion was a significant predictor of national-
level CEO effects, suggesting that nations with a 
greater level of discretion have firms with 
greater CEO effects. 
 
p 
dispersio
n; legal 
origin; 
employe
r 
flexibility 
Note: HPWS = high performance work system; TMT = top management team; CSQ = commitment to status quo; 
ROA = return on assets; PP&E = property, plant, and equipment; SEC = Securities and Exchange Commission; CIO 
= chief information officer; IT = information technology; MBA = master in business administration; ROS = return 
on sales. 
 
 
Figure 3 Summary of Managerial Discretion as a Mediator or Moderator 
Note: Factors in bold have been found to significantly support moderating or mediating effects; underlined 
factors have been empirically tested but no significant support has been found; italicized factors have not been 
empirically tested as moderators. Independent and dependent variables shown are those used in empirical 
studies where significant moderating or mediating effects were supported. Plus and minus signs indicate factors 
acting as positive and negative moderators, respectively. Moderating factors adapted from Hambrick and 
Finkelstein (1987) and Finkelstein, Hambrick, and Cannella (2009). 
Discretion as a moderator 
Studies utilizing managerial discretion as a moderator have examined a number of important outcomes largely 
related to firm performance and strategic changes. With regards to strategy, Finkelstein and Hambrick 
(1990) find that TMT tenure is associated with strategic conformity and persistence; however, these 
relationships were stronger in a higher discretion industry than in a lower discretion industry, suggesting that 
high discretion industries enable TMTs to have a greater influence on strategy. Similar findings are echoed 
by Hambrick, Geletkanycz, and Fredrickson (1993), who find that strong performance leads to a management 
commitment to the status quo in high discretion industries. Relatedly, Goll, Johnson, and Rasheed (2008)found 
that the association of TMT demographics and the type of strategy firms pursued was contingent upon a firm 
being in a high discretion industry. The authors note that in deregulated environments, younger and less 
tenured managers and TMTs with greater functional diversity emphasized a low-cost strategy during 
deregulation, while better educated executives emphasized pursuing a differentiation strategy in the 
deregulated industry. 
Discretion can also influence the relationship between management characteristics (or strategy) and firm 
performance. For instance, Adams et al. (2005), using Hambrick and Abrahamson’s (1995) industry measures, 
found that discretion from CEO power has a greater effect on firm performance variability in industries with 
greater discretion. Furthermore, a CEO’s commitment to the status quo is associated with lower accounting firm 
performance only in high discretion industries (McClelland et al., 2010). Similar results hold for market 
performance in a high discretion industry; however, a CEO’s commitment to the status quo combined with low 
discretion industries positively enhances market performance. Haleblian and Finkelstein (1993) find that CEO 
dominance and team size were related to firm performance only when discretion was high, while Messersmith, 
Lee, Guthrie, and Li (2013) found a significant relationship between TMT turnover and firm performance as 
moderated by industry growth rate. 
Researchers also illustrate discretion’s moderating effects on CEO dismissal (Crossland & Chen, 2013), CEO 
compensation (Magnan & St. Onge, 1997), and abnormal shareholder returns (J. T. Campbell et al., 2012). One 
interesting study by Datta, Guthrie, and Wright (2005) found that three task environment factors positively 
strengthened the relationship between high performance work systems and labor productivity, suggesting that 
high performance work systems more strongly influence productivity in high discretion industries. These studies 
suggest that discretion influences firm-level outcomes and strategic decision making. Future research should 
continue to use discretion as a contingency moderator to examine factors that enable or constrain strategic 
decision making and how such factors influence firm outcomes. Furthermore, the majority of research 
employing discretion as a moderator has examined it using task environment factors, rather than exploring 
managerial characteristics or internal organization factors. 
Discretion as a mediator 
A relative paucity of work has attempted to use discretion as a mediator. Despite this, the research that has 
employed measures of discretion as a mediator has identified fruitful findings. Preston, Chen, and Leidner 
(2008) examined chief information officer (CIO) decision-making authority as a measure of discretion, finding 
that CIO decision-making authority mediated the relationship between four measures of the organizational 
environment and information technology’s ability to contribute to firm performance. Buchholtz, Amason, and 
Rutherford (1999) examine the effect of resources as a factor in corporate philanthropy. Managerial discretion 
was found to fully mediate the relationship between firm resources and corporate philanthropy, with the 
relationship between managerial discretion and corporate philanthropy partially mediated by the values of the 
TMT. Finally, Crossland and Hambrick (2011) find that managerial discretion, measured via country-level ratings 
by an expert panel of academics and analysts, mediates the effects of uncertainty tolerance, individualism, 
cultural looseness, ownership dispersion, and legal origin on CEO effectiveness. 
In sum, research to date has begun to explore questions of how managerial discretion affects a wide variety of 
outcomes and what contributes to discretion. Despite this, many gaps remain, given the limited number of 
studies that measure discretion directly. Similar to methodologies employed in examining managerial 
discretion’s consequences, well over half of the studies applying discretion as a moderator or mediator use 
archival data as a proxy for discretion. Thus, our understanding of how the relationships between executive, 
firm, and industry antecedents and outcomes (e.g., firm performance, executive compensation, and strategy 
change) are affected by organizational culture and other inertial forces and a manager’s psychological traits is 
very limited. Additionally, only a limited number of studies attempt to examine firm-level decisions affected by 
discretion, and the role that discretion can play in enhancing the effectiveness of certain actions in certain 
environments. 
Future Managerial Discretion Research Opportunities 
Our review illustrates that since Hambrick and Finkelstein (1987) formally introduced the concept of managerial 
discretion, a number of studies have attempted to examine the antecedents and consequences of managerial 
latitude of action. Despite these studies, however, significant opportunities still exist for researchers to explore 
how managerial discretion is influenced by a variety of forces, as well as how such forces influence many 
organizational outcomes, both individually and in combination. In this section, we examine some of the 
empirical gaps that remain and describe important questions and areas for future research. 
Improving Measures of Managerial Discretion 
We see an excessive reliance on archival data in measuring managerial discretion. While there are substantial 
challenges associated with surveys and interviews of senior executives, and content analysis of annual reports 
and correspondence with the media, it seems unlikely that we can develop support for many of the human 
factors that affect discretion without such efforts. Thus, we encourage researchers to devote their creative 
energy towards methods that will give us a more complete assessment of the managerial discretion construct. 
Relatedly, we also encourage researchers to seek discretion measures that discriminate the construct from its 
closely related psychological (e.g., locus of control), organizational (e.g., inertia), and environmental (e.g., 
market growth) antecedents.5 Additionally, we call for future research to develop composite measures of 
discretion. We encourage developing composite measures that appropriately weight the various factors within 
the internal organization and managerial characteristics forces. Such a composite measure will likely need to use 
a mix of archival data and data derived from nonarchival methods, but we would encourage researchers to seek 
to validate all measures and weightings using a variety of methods. Using more sophisticated modeling 
techniques may allow researchers to create latent constructs related to each discretion force and ultimately an 
overall construct based on discretion forces identified in research, furthering validation of the construct. 
Assessing Managerial Discretion’s Construct Validity 
Despite the many studies that rely upon the managerial discretion construct, we identified only four studies that 
measure discretion as a dependent variable as well as a handful of other studies that use direct measures of 
managerial discretion. These studies have enhanced our knowledge of what yields discretion, providing support 
for measures such as locus of control and industry R&D and advertising intensity increasing managerial 
perceptions of discretion. Despite these findings, many of the original concepts proposed by Hambrick and 
Finkelstein (1987) remain untested. Many studies reviewed merely use proxies for discretion proposed by 
Hambrick and Finkelstein as indicators of discretion without testing their validity.6Studies that measure task 
environment discretion with a continuous variable often use variants of Hambrick and Abrahamson’s 
(1995) calculation of managerial discretion. While this provides some basis for measuring task environment 
discretion, that study is nearly 20 years old and has never been replicated with its measures validated with other 
samples. 
Prior management research has suggested that “the substantive stream has been relatively overemphasized in 
strategic management research without corresponding concern for measurement” (Venkatraman & Grant, 
1986: 71). Validating measures provides construct validity and reduces the likelihood that measurement errors, 
such as random error and method variance, bias results (Bagozzi, Yi, & Phillips, 1991). Without further research 
validating many commonly used proxies as indicators of discretion, research has not achieved construct validity 
for many managerial discretion measures currently employed. Failing to achieve construct validity may yield 
both Type I and II errors when researchers employ measures designed to represent managerial discretion. 
Indeed, the limited studies performed to date examining managerial and task environment characteristics on 
discretion find that not all proposed factors examined yield discretion. Relying upon Hambrick and Finkelstein’s 
(1987) model as the basis for identifying measures of discretion is not enough to establish construct validity. In 
order to accomplish this, researchers have several opportunities. First, as described in the previous section, 
composite measures of discretion across the forces identified by Hambrick and Finkelstein could be evaluated to 
determine whether managerial discretion serves as a higher order construct based on indicators of the latent 
variables associated with each force. Second, future research could pilot additional studies with industry 
experts, academics, and managers to assess the level of discretion in firms, industries, and nations and test the 
validity of previously employed managerial discretion measures, in accordance with prior construct validation 
studies. Measuring such variables with expert ratings would allow researchers to determine whether commonly 
used proxies of discretion still are indicative of discretion. Finally, nonarchival methods, such as surveys, 
interviews, and content analysis, should be used by researchers studying organizations to seek an in-depth 
understanding of how discretionary forces influence executive decision making and perceived discretion. A 
significant opportunity exists for researchers to identify and determine which factors yield discretion and 
triangulate such proxies with alternative means of measuring discretion.7 
Beyond an increased focus on methods used to examine managerial discretion, we call for research to further 
examine causal relationships. For example, Hambrick and Finkelstein (1987) posited that a CEO’s power base 
influences discretion, yet it is also reasonable to posit a reverse causation. Future research that also seeks to 
illuminate potential causal paths that are not supported would greatly help disentangle the managerial 
discretion construct from the psychological constructs that compose the managerial characteristics force. 
Managerial Characteristics and Perceived Discretion 
Our review identifies that significant research attention has been paid to the task environment’s influence on 
managerial discretion, while a paucity of research focuses on managerial characteristics. Literature from 
psychology provides a number of characteristics that alter how individuals perceive situations and make 
decisions that would greatly enhance an executive’s perceived level of discretion. While gaining access to more 
fine-grained data on top manager characteristics is a significant challenge for management researchers, a 
number of important insights could be gained with access to such data. As noted earlier, the psychological 
microfoundations of the manager can indicate whether he or she acts enabled or constrained. While locus of 
control and other managerial characteristics detailed in the managerial discretion model may strongly influence 
managerial discretion, several additional characteristics beyond the model could strongly affect managerial 
discretion research, including domain-specific self-efficacy, executive confidence, and preference for novelty 
versus stability. 
Domain-specific self-efficacy refers to executives’ confidence that they can successfully carry out the tasks of 
their leadership role, resulting in improved and sustained firm performance (Gist & Mitchell, 1992; Judge, Bono, 
Ilies, & Gerhardt, 2002). Domain specificity simply focuses Bandura’s (1977) concept of generalized self-efficacy 
to the executive’s sphere of influence. Many of the managerial characteristics related to discretion, such as 
commitment to the status quo and aspiration levels, are driven by whether executives believe that they can 
control events and achieve positive outcomes. Furthermore, successful outcomes will increase executives’ self-
efficacy within the firm and industry and, thus, will increase their perceived discretion (Lindsley, Brass, & 
Thomas, 1995), while poor outcomes and performance will ultimately reduce executives’ perceived discretion. 
An executive’s confidence may also affect the degree to which an executive perceives a need for change or 
believes that actions taken will yield successful results (Moore & Healy, 2008). More confident CEOs invest in a 
greater variety of projects (Malmendier & Tate, 2005). Thus, executives’ confidence influences their latitude of 
action in undertaking certain decisions. Furthermore, insights based on domain-specific self-efficacy may 
indicate that executives’ discretion changes over time as they gain confidence in their abilities as a manager, 
suggesting that a manager’s perceived level of discretion may increase, possibly over the course of the 
manager’s tenure in a top executive position (Hambrick & Fukutomi, 1991). However, a series of poor decision 
outcomes for a top executive over time may have the opposite effect, reducing his or her self-efficacy and, thus, 
perceptions of discretion. 
A third psychological microfoundation applicable to managerial discretion is a manager’s preference for novelty 
versus stability. Hambrick and Finkelstein (1987) discuss how executives who are intolerant of ambiguity may 
simply not consider actions that lack a clear “line of sight” in their execution. Such executives prioritize order 
over developing new possible strategic directions. Alternatively, executives who embrace novelty are more likely 
to be more innovative, encourage organizational playfulness, and lead their organization in addressing new 
opportunities (Katsaros & Nicolaidis, 2012; Wilkinson, 2006). 
The Institutional Environment and Managerial Discretion 
Crossland and Hambrick (2007, 2011) illustrate how nation-level institutions affect the degree to which CEOs 
matter to firm outcomes. This line of inquiry adds an important, fourth force related to managerial discretion: 
the institutional environment. Insights from sociology on institutional analysis and from political science on 
comparative political economy provide evidence of how institutions can both constrain and enable the behavior 
of organizations (for a review, see J. L. Campbell, 2004: Chapter 1). While Crossland and Hambrick begin to 
examine the role of institutions in altering executives’ latitude of action, considerable room still exists to 
examine country-level traits that affect behavior and the role of institutional forces that limit behavior. For 
instance, J. L. Campbell (2007) notes that governmental institutions can significantly alter firm behaviors, such as 
social responsibility through regulation, but such regulations are also likely to have a stronger impact when 
negotiated between the government and corporations. Furthermore, such regulations are likely to be effective 
when self-instituted by a set of firms. Thus, either formal or informal norms created through a joint institution of 
competing firms may limit managerial discretion by indicating a set of appropriate behaviors. Previously used 
management concepts, such as power distance, openness, and level of referent power, may also significantly 
influence the level of discretion provided by institutions. Finally, the presence of nongovernmental institutions 
and third party stakeholders, such as watchdog agencies, may place pressure upon organizations to act in 
certain manners (Schneiberg & Bartley, 2001), limiting the latitude of actions available to managers. Future 
research should consider how such institutional pressures affect the discretion that is afforded to managers 
independent of the organization’s immediate competitive task environment. 
Managerial Discretion as a Time Varying Construct 
Our review further indicates that research has examined managerial discretion as a static construct. Longitudinal 
analyses on managerial discretion are likely to illustrate a complex interplay of discretion over time. In some 
cases, events, such as changes in the task environment encountered by all firms in an industry, occur which may 
alter managerial discretion. For example, the managerial discretion of U.S. airline executives was dramatically 
constrained after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, shut down the industry for several days and 
dramatically reduced the demand for air travel, with demand not recovering to pre–9/11 levels for 3 years 
(Notis, 2005). In the close aftermath of 9/11, managerial discretion was severely reduced at most U.S. airlines to 
actions primarily focused on avoiding bankruptcy. Such fluctuations in managerial discretion over time have 
largely been absent from the literature. 
Furthermore, changes in internal forces, such as the firm’s size, age, and powerful inside forces, such as the 
composition of the board of directors and turnover of top managers following a CEO succession, may model 
changes over time in discretion. However, only limited research examines how executives may influence their 
level of managerial discretion over time. For instance, Westphal (1998) illustrates how executives use 
ingratiation and persuasion toward board members when the board increases its independence to maintain 
their influence. The limited work done in this area, however, primarily focuses on how executives employ power 
and influence tactics against the board to achieve desired outcomes (e.g., Bebchuk & Fried, 2006; Zajac & 
Westphal, 1996). While studies from agency theory explore how CEOs may gain domination of a board using 
influence and nomination tactics, fewer studies, such as Westphal, have explored in-depth processes related to 
influence and persuasion. Future studies may explore whether additional factors, such as firm performance or 
CEO reputation or celebrity, may also enhance CEO discretion. For instance, poor performance may enhance 
shareholder and board monitoring, reducing the latitude of action CEOs have. Alternatively, higher reputation 
CEOs may gain more discretion given the positive beliefs regarding their actions. 
Finally, as noted earlier, not all managerial characteristics are static. Executives’ domain-specific self-efficacy 
may increase during their tenure as they become more familiar with the new position and learn more about the 
task environment (Hambrick & Fukutomi, 1991; Lindsley et al., 1995). Therefore, over time, executives’ 
managerial characteristics may enhance their perceived level of discretion. Such arguments would be consistent 
with prior research, such as Ocasio (1994), who finds that the level of an executive’s power changes during the 
course of his or her tenure. Research could examine such characteristics that affect the degree to which 
executives are likely to undertake significant strategic decisions within their firms. Alternatively, research also 
shows that as executives achieve success, they become committed to an existing course of action or the status 
quo (Audia, Locke, & Smith, 2000). Such commitment may reduce executives’ perceived level of discretion by 
limiting the choices the executives perceive to preserve their legacy. 
Managerial Discretion Forces as Substitutes Versus Complements 
Insights and research from corporate governance (e.g., Rediker & Seth, 1995) and transactional governance 
(e.g., Poppo & Zenger, 2002) suggest that mechanisms designed to control behavior may serve as 
complementary forces or substitutes. From the substitution perspective, for example, significant monitoring 
behavior by the board may be unnecessary if high-powered incentives align the interests of self-interested 
managers with shareholders. A significant opportunity exists for managerial discretion scholars to examine 
whether and under what conditions the forces identified as constraining or enabling discretion serve as 
complements or substitutes or whether these forces complement or substitute for other firm activities. For 
instance, when the task environment is highly regulated, overly competitive, and/or lacks product 
differentiation, discretion is likely to be limited. In such cases, is it necessary for boards to closely monitor 
managerial behavior to ensure managers do not act opportunistically? Alternatively, further managerial 
discretion research may yield insights to corporate governance research by suggesting that when discretion is 
high, corporate governance mechanisms may be more necessary and beneficial. Whether discretionary forces 
serve as complements or substitutes has interesting implications for both organizations and individuals. 
Organizational consequences 
Research from corporate governance suggests that organizations perceive governance mechanisms as 
complements (Schepker & Oh, 2013). With regard to discretion, multiple forces may complement each other to 
enhance discretion or serve as substitutes, with limited forces needed only to constrain such discretion. If 
discretion forces serve as complements, executives are likely to have greatest control when their characteristics, 
the internal organization, and the task environment provide greater discretion. In these situations, outcomes 
would be expected to be highly variable with managers receiving greater compensation. Furthermore, such 
firms may be more likely to lack strategic conformity and commitment to the status quo. Alternatively, 
discretion may be most limited when managerial characteristics, internal forces, and the task environment all 
constrain discretion, likely leading to strategic persistence and few strategic choices undertaken. If forces serve 
as complements, future research could illustrate how these forces work together to further alter variability of 
outcomes. 
If managerial discretion forces serve as substitutes, a different story arises. For instance, powerful inside forces 
may not limit managerial discretion when other discretionary forces, such as the manager’s characteristics or 
the institutional environment, limit perceived discretion. Consistent with perspectives on governance 
mechanisms as substitutes, powerful monitoring by inside forces may yield only costs to the organization 
without any additional benefits. From an agency theory perspective, governance mechanisms may be less 
necessary when the manager’s characteristics or the task environment constrain discretion. Alternatively, firms 
may need to be more conscious of the need for strong monitoring when managers’ characteristics lead 
managers to perceive greater discretion and/or when the task environment yields discretion. Discretion may 
inform agency theory research on corporate governance such that corporate governance mechanisms may be 
most necessary and beneficial when discretion is high, as executives have the greatest ability to pursue their 
own self-interests. Failure to appropriately monitor behavior may exacerbate potential problems related to 
discretion. 
A final situation may arise where an executive’s characteristics lead to him or her lacking (having) discretion at 
the individual level while operating in a high (low) discretion environment. In such situations, the individual may 
undertake or fail to undertake decisions that are consistent with the environment in which the executive’s firm 
operates, thus either destroying value or failing to capture value creating opportunities. Additionally, if the 
environment in which the firm operates or various organizational forces constrain executives’ latitude of action 
associated with strategic decisions, such as product development and marketing, the executives (driven by their 
psychological traits) may focus on other areas where they feel they can have a greater influence. Indeed, 
executives may have significant discretion towards some types of organizational decisions and outcomes while 
having little in other types. Future research should consider what types of organizational actions discretion limits 
and whether all actions are affected by discretion or whether only certain types of organizational actions may be 
affected. In short, organizations, executives, and boards of directors should be aware of and understand how 
each of the four discretion forces affects their organizations and account for them appropriately. Future 
research can examine the interplay between different levels of discretion to understand how each type of 
discretion differentially and interactively affects executive decision making across the firm’s operational and 
strategic domains and firm-level outcomes. Research on discretion could greatly benefit from a discussion of 
which discretionary forces complement and substitute each other and under which conditions. This line of 
inquiry could have significant implications for researchers in additional fields, such as corporate governance. 
Individual outcomes 
Discretion has primarily been examined from an organizational perspective with research failing to examine how 
perceptions of discretion influence individual managers. Microresearch may reveal psychological and career 
consequences for managers affected by different levels of managerial discretion. First, psychology research 
notes that the fit between an individual and his or her environment is an important consideration “that 
necessarily includes one’s compatibility with multiple systems in the work environment” (Kristof-Brown, Jansen, 
& Colbert, 2002: 985). Thus, choosing an appropriate organization and environment for an individual is an 
important concern for individuals (Rynes & Cable, 2003). Aligning an individual with his or her organization is 
related to job performance, organizational citizenship behavior, turnover, job satisfaction, and commitment 
(Hoffman & Woehr, 2006; Kristof-Brown, Zimmerman, & Johnson, 2005). 
An important consideration for executives is whether they are placed in a situation where they can exercise the 
appropriate amount of discretion for their own satisfaction. For instance, an executive with an internal locus of 
control may feel hampered when placed in an older firm with an established, resistant culture. The executive 
may feel that efforts to change the organization are thwarted and may experience negative personal outcomes, 
such as job dissatisfaction or greater intentions to quit. Firms should understand that selecting high discretion 
executives in a low discretion environment may yield greater turnover, which may lead to major consequences 
for the firm as it cycles through executives. Such frustration is also likely to increase stress and anxiety, while low 
discretion managers in high discretion environments are likely to face greater perceived job demands (Hambrick, 
Finkelstein, & Mooney, 2005). Future research could examine the role that fit between a potential executive and 
the firm’s environment plays in selecting the appropriate executive. Furthermore, research should examine how 
mismatches in the executive’s personal discretion and the organization and environment’s afforded discretion 
influence negative outcomes for executives, including stress and anxiety. For instance, Jex and Beehr 
(1991) note that organizational constraints increase the level of stress experienced. Their research further 
illustrates that such stress leads to strains, which affect employee health and well-being. Discretion researchers 
may be able to utilize such research to examine the effects of such strain in executives who fail to fit in their 
organization or environment. Failure to consider such outcomes may yield both poor strategic outcomes and 
poor individual outcomes. 
Applying the managerial discretion construct to other management disciplines can provide greater meaning and 
understanding to those disciplines. For instance, researchers might examine the value of constructs such as 
organizational commitment, organizational identity, and organizational citizenship behaviors in high discretion 
industries (e.g., foods/beverages) versus low discretion industries (e.g., public utilities). While such employee 
traits and behaviors may always be highly desirable, understanding their value in different industry 
environments may provide a greater grasp of when and how resources should be used to develop and enhance 
these traits and behaviors. Additionally, while one study has shown that the effectiveness of high performance 
work systems is enhanced in industries with higher discretion (Datta et al., 2005), additional research should 
examine whether discretion has implications for how employees are managed, developed, and rewarded. 
Managerial Discretion Within the Organization 
Our review also indicates the role that managerial discretion plays at the organizational level with regard to 
outcomes such as firm performance variability, commitment to a defined course of action, or even CEO 
compensation. Absent from research, however, is the level of discretion that middle managers within an 
organization perceive. The role of organizational members outside of the TMT, such as middle managers, in 
influencing internal outcomes is also important. Studies on change management and strategy implementation 
suggest that middle-level managers are important conduits for explaining changes in strategy and ensuring that 
strategy is implemented appropriately. Effective strategy implementation is likely to require discretion at all 
levels of the organization to implement actions that are consistent with the strategy composed by the 
organization’s leaders. For instance, prior research identifies five antecedents to middle-level manager 
entrepreneurial behavior: (1) management support, (2) work discretion and autonomy, (3) rewards and 
reinforcement, (4) time availability, and (5) organizational boundaries (Kuratko, Ireland, Covin, & Hornsby, 
2005). In short, research provides evidence that organizations can promote behavior by middle managers that 
leads to positive outcomes. Failure to provide discretion to managers hampers their ability to implement the 
strategy without effectively seeking approval and limits the speed at which strategy may be implemented. 
Future research should continue to further consider the role of discretion directly on internal strategy 
implementation and the role that middle managers play in implementing strategy. 
Conclusion 
Strategy studies have long considered the ability of executives to affect organizational strategic decision making. 
However, upon the publication of Hambrick and Finkelstein’s (1987) discussion of managerial discretion, 
research began more thoroughly examining the forces that affect managerial latitude of actions, leading 
executives to have stronger effects. While this research has extended our knowledge of how and when 
executives matter, there are many important and challenging questions that remain open for researchers. As 
research on managerial discretion continues to grow, it is important to ensure we have a strong understanding 
of what yields discretion. Additionally, work is needed to develop more robust ways to measure discretion and 
how it can change over time. Furthermore, significant questions still abound with regard to how executive 
characteristics and internal factors affect the level of discretion managers perceive. Finally, understanding how 
these factors interact to further affect executive decision making remains a strong avenue for researchers to 
consider. 
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Notes 
1.Hambrick and Finkelstein (1987) also posited that powerful internal stakeholders may be extraordinarily 
confident as a result of past successes (March & Simon, 1958) or may have tremendous zeal for 
traditional prioritization of actions (Peters & Waterman, 1982). 
2.The following journals were considered “top journals” in our literature review: Academy of Management 
Journal, Academy of Management Review, Administrative Science Quarterly, Journal of Applied 
Psychology, Journal of International Business Studies, Journal of Management, Journal of Management 
Studies, Strategic Management Journal, Management Science, and Organization Science. 
3.Google’s Web site ranks articles for relevance in the following manner: 
Google Scholar aims to rank documents the way researchers do, weighing the full text of each document, where it was published, who it 
was written by, as well as how often and how recently is has been cited in other scholarly literature. 
(http://scholar.google.com/intl/en-US/scholar/about.html) 
While Google does not release their specific ranking algorithm, we feel strongly that these are richer criteria 
than citations since it reduces the potential of missing more recent articles. Furthermore, since Google 
Scholar’s algorithm accounts for journal quality, recent articles in high quality journals are likely to be 
higher on the relevance list. 
4.During our review process, we felt that several articles prior to 1987 strongly operationalized forces in 
the Hambrick and Finkelstein (1987) model (e.g., Lieberson & O’Connor, 1972; Miller et al., 1982). 
5.We are grateful to one reviewer for suggesting the need for future research that discriminates the managerial 
discretion construct from closely related psychological antecedents. 
6.Proxies for task environment–provided discretion include comparing industries selected for research described 
as either being high or low in managerial discretion. In some cases, industry selections in studies are 
justified by researchers using qualitative descriptions of the industry as either providing high or low 
latitude of action to industry top managers. In other studies, researchers may corroborate an industry 
selection as having either high or low discretion on the basis of quantitative differences with other 
industries on variables theorized to affect managerial discretion, such as capital intensity, regulation, or 
industry growth. 
7.For exemplars in management research in attempting to assess construct validity, see Bagozzi et al. 
(1991) and Hoskisson, Hitt, Johnson, and Moesel (1993). 
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